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bstract
n this paper, I examine the role that strategic analysis has played on antitrust and discuss new analytical venues. In order to accomplish this
oal, the paper presents two directions. Initially, I undertake a review of the current debate between antitrust and strategy. I argue that much of
he contemporary discussion on the subject is founded on traditional economic approaches to strategy, what leads to the disregard of the role of
rm heterogeneity in competitive dynamics. In the second part of the paper, I sketch an approach to antitrust based on the resource-based view of
trategy. This approach is particularly useful in examining the conditions of market rivalry, being a complement – not necessarily a substitute – to
he traditional antitrust economic analysis.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
eywords: Strategy; Antitrust; Market power; RBV
esumo
este artigo, é examinado o papel que a análise estratégica tem desempenhado no antitruste e são discutidos novos caminhos. A fim de alcanc¸ar
ste objetivo, o trabalho apresenta duas direc¸ões. Inicialmente, realiza-se a revisão do debate atual sobre a relac¸ão entre antitruste e estratégia.
efende-se que grande parte da discussão contemporânea sobre o assunto se baseia em abordagens econômicas tradicionais de estratégia, o que
eva à desconsiderac¸ão do papel da heterogeneidade da firma na dinâmica competitiva. Na segunda parte do artigo, é esboc¸ada uma abordagem
e antitruste fundamentada na visão baseada em recursos. Esta abordagem é particularmente útil para examinar as condic¸ões de rivalidade do
ercado, sendo um complemento – e não necessariamente um substituto – à análise econômica antitruste tradicional.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumen
n este artículo se evalúa el papel que el análisis estratégico ha jugado en la defensa de la competencia y se discuten nuevos caminos. Para ello,
e presentan dos direcciones. Inicialmente, se lleva a cabo una revisión del actual debate sobre la relación entre la defensa de la competencia y la
strategia. Se argumenta que gran parte de la discusión contemporánea sobre el tema se basa en los enfoques económicos tradicionales de estrategia,
o que lleva a ignorar el papel de la heterogeneidad de la organización en la dinámica competitiva. En la segunda parte del artículo, se describe
n enfoque de antimonopolio que se apoya en la visión basada en recursos. Este enfoque es particularmente útil para examinar las condiciones de
ompetencia del mercado, y puede complementar – y no necesariamente reemplazar – el análisis económico antitrust  tradicional.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
alabras clave: Estrategia; Defensa de la competencia; Poder de mercado; RBV
ntroduction
The antitrust analysis is widely recognized as an interdisci-
linary field of research and practice, within which economics
nd the law establish a fruitful dialog. As an ultimate expres-
ion of this synergy, it is common to find economics professors
eaching antitrust courses in law schools, mainly in Europe and
he US. Building on this interdisciplinary perspective, I argue in
he present paper that in addition to economics and the law, the
ntitrust analysis can draw inspiration from a third discipline:
trategy.
Although the above claim is not fundamentally new (see
oer, 2002, 2003; Hawker, 2003; Oberholzer-Gee & Yao, 2010),
t is proposed here that much of the previous discussion on
ntitrust and strategy has been narrowly based on the the-
retical approach proposed by Porter (2001). The objective
f this perspective paper is then twofold: (i) to undertake a
eview of the debate between antitrust and strategy and (ii) to
resent a framework inspired by the resource-based view of
trategy (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), which can shed light
n new aspects so far disregarded by the traditional antitrust
nalysis.
In general terms, the importance of this theoretical exer-
ise should not be underestimated. The antitrust policy is
n important component of the institutional environment in
hich firms establish their perpetual struggle to achieve sus-
ained competitive advantages. The economic theory usually
pplied to antitrust analysis, in turn, is a limited analytical
ool since it is more concerned with understanding the struc-
ure and functioning of specific markets, casting a macroscopic
ook at firms’ strategies. For that reason, the strategy scholar-
hip has the potential to help the advancement of the antitrust
nalysis.
The present article is divided into three parts besides this
ntroduction. Section ‘Taking steps: what do we know about
he relationship between antitrust and strategy?’ makes a broad
eview of the literature on antitrust and strategy, stressing its
otentialities and weaknesses. Section ‘Thinking ahead: is there
Taking  steps:  what  do  we  know  about  the  relationship
between antitrust  and  strategy?
The idea of incorporating concepts from strategy – and more
generally from management – in the antitrust analysis is not
unprecedented. Foer (2002, 2003), for example, usually resorts
to the image of antitrust as a three-legged stool, which has been
resting precariously on only two of them. These two legs are
the Law School and the Department of Economics. The third
missing leg is the Business School. The underlying claim is that
the antitrust analysis does not take into account the firm itself
and the individual decision makers within the firm. More impor-
tantly, the Business School would be a counterpoint to what is
understood as the analytical limitations imposed by neoclassi-
cal economics. As noted by Hawker (2003), in the heart of the
Chicago approach to antitrust is the hypothesis (arising from the
neoclassical price theory) that firms rationally seek to maximize
their profit. The focal point of strategic management, however,
is not the maximization of profit per se, but obtaining a sustained
competitive advantage.
The concept of sustained competitive advantage is associated
with the idea of corporate success in terms of above-normal per-
formance (i.e., economic rents) for an indefinite period of time.
According to Barney (1991), a firm has a competitive advan-
tage when establishing a strategy of value creation that is not
simultaneously implemented by any competitor. This advantage
is, moreover, sustained when actual and potential competitors
are unable to duplicate the benefits associated with the strat-
egy. Because the building of sustained competitive advantage
is a tentative process, Foer (2003) argues that business schools
have the ability to help the antitrust to move beyond the neo-
classical abstractions of the economic man – i.e., the perfectly
rational individual found in the ideas espoused by the Chicago
approach.1 In addition, business schools have something impor-
tant to say about competitive dynamics, which are not fully
captured by neoclassical assumptions (e.g., Oberholzer-Gee &
Yao, 2010; Pleatsikas & Teece, 2001). role for strategic analysis within antitrust?’ then explores
ew analytical venues on the subject, specifically presenting a
omplementary framework for the antitrust analysis of market
ivalry. Section ‘Conclusion’ concludes the discussion, posing
uestions for future research.
p
o
u1 Leary (2003) notes that “[a]ll I will say here, in summary, is that I believe our
resent methods of antitrust analysis are still mired too much in an obsolete view
f what competition is all about and that they are likely to become increasingly
nrealistic”.
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of the five forces (internal rivalry, entry, substitute products and
services, customers and suppliers) can be significant in deter-
mining competition, depending on the specific industry underG.F.A Monteiro / Revista de A
Despite this potential, Oberholzer-Gee and Yao (2010) find
hat the influence of strategic thinking in the antitrust field is
irtually zero.2 According to the authors, while numerous fac-
ors probably contribute to this limited influence, three aspects
eserve special consideration: In an essential level, antitrust law
s primarily focused on the welfare of the consumer. Although
conomists normally analyze the effects of business conducts on
he welfare of consumers and producers, strategists are focused
lmost completely on the welfare of the producer. A second
eason is that strategy scholarship adopts various approaches
nd is perhaps less accurate in its predictions compared with
conomics. Given the diversity of approaches used by strategy
esearchers, in conjunction with the myriad of factors that may
nfluence the success of a firm, it is without surprise that the field
f strategy has produced many competing theories about the pre-
ise sources of superior performance of the firm. Finally, a third
ossible reason may be the lack of enthusiasm within antitrust
o carry out accurate assessments of different justifications for
ast and expected business conducts.
Hawker (2003) highlights two additional problems that must
e addressed by anyone who seeks to apply business scholar-
hip in antitrust analysis. First, one should select a particular
iscipline among the multitude of disciplines that comprise
he business curriculum. Second, the academic management
esearch does not have a readership among business managers
s widespread as academic legal research has between lawyers.
onsequently, academic research can provide insights on busi-
ess thinking, but even mainstream academic journals do not
irectly influence the thinking of businessmen.
Together, the references discussed above highlight the poten-
ial gains and indicate the low penetration of management and
trategic thinking on antitrust analysis. The first, and to the best
f my knowledge the only attempt to formulate a framework for
ntitrust analysis explicitly based on strategy dates back to the
ork of Michael Porter presented at a symposium sponsored by
he American Bar Association (ABA) in 2001.3 In what follows,
 analyze Porter’s approach, as well as the criticism made against
t.
he  Porter’s  approach  to  antitrustThe main objective of the 2001 ABA symposium was to dis-
uss the appropriate role of market concentration on merger
eviews from the perspective of antitrust law.4 Inspired by this
2 In order to analyze the influence of strategic management in antitrust,
berholzer-Gee and Yao (2010) measure the prevalence of “strategic ideas”
n antitrust policies and procedures. To do so, the authors conducted a com-
arison of numbers of citations. First, they compare the number of times that
udicial decisions and legal journals cite renowned researchers in the areas of
trategy and microeconomics. Secondly, they tabulate the citations to the three
ajor journals in strategy and its economic counterpart. Finally, they search for
eferences to concepts that are central to the strategy and industrial organization.
3 The American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section Task Force on Funda-
ental Theory, Washington, D.C., January 2001.
4 The Task Force Mission Statement provided that “[t]he Task Force on Fun-
amental Theory will examine whether the concentration thesis underlying the
overnment’s present approach to merger control has any continuing validity, in
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uestion, Porter (2001) sketched an antitrust approach whose
ssential point is the growth of productivity.
Porter (2001) takes a critical attitude in relation to the tra-
itional antitrust approach. He argues that although the stated
ole of the antitrust policy is to promote and protect competition
n behalf of consumers’ welfare, this rationale is often unclear,
nderstood wrongly or with a very limited scope, focusing too
uch on market concentration and price settings. In the concep-
ion of Porter (2001), the antitrust should be concerned, above
ll, with the growth of productivity, since this is the most impor-
ant determinant of both the consumers’ long-term welfare and
he standard of living of a country.
Porter (2001) notes that productivity growth is associated
ith innovation, which in turn is manifested through the com-
ercialization of products and services of higher value to the
onsumer along with the development of more efficient modes
f production. The innovative process is greatly dependent on the
resence of a strong competition in the marketplace. According
o the author, this is the primary justification for the existence
f an antitrust policy: to safeguard competition as an inducer
f innovations that raise the productivity of the economy. The
ain goal of the antitrust policy is then to encourage a dynamic
rocess of improvement (i.e., innovations in product, process,
nd management), given its effect on productivity growth.5 In
uch a case, higher prices should be an antitrust warning sign
nly if it is not associated with an increasing value delivered to
he consumer.6 In this same light, the high profitability of a firm
s not an issue of concern when it reflects superior products or
enefits obtained by means of operational efficiency (see also
emsetz, 1973).
Regarding the implementation of antitrust policy, Porter
2001) notes that standard antitrust procedure – i.e., the exam-
nation of the number of firms in a market, its concentration
nd profitability – captures only a small part of a more complex
henomenon, at the same time that it deflects analysis to less
roductive debates about where to place the boundaries of the
elevant market. As an alternative, Porter (2001) proposes the
se of the five forces analysis framework (Porter, 1985). Anyiew of the empirical and theoretical work of the past several decades, most of
hich suggests that concentration as such is a poor predictor of actual conduct
dverse to the competitive process”.
5 As noted by Davidson (2012), these ideas expressed by Porter are not entirely
nconsistent with the traditional antitrust thinking.
“[. . .] monopoly profits are an unwarranted transfer of income from con-
sumers to producers, but a much more significant economic effect of
competition is the encouragement of innovation. That innovation is the
source of maintaining and increasing the standard of living in the United
States and throughout the world”.
6 It is interesting to note the existence of a latent contradiction between the idea
f higher prices reflecting higher value delivered to the customer and the notion
xpressed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice and
ederal Trade Commission) that market power refers to “the ability to profitably
aintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time”.
3 dmin
e
c
b
t
p
h
s
o
c
h
c
o
t
a
w
a
p
s
p
t
p
t
a
r
a
l
r
t
m
f
a
a
a
t
t
i
w
e
a
t
s
a
a
m
o
r
r
s
s
o
c
m
p
t
m
n
e
l
a
c
l
m
o
p
a
a
a
y
t
s
t
i
t
m
m
c
(
p
f
c
W
C20 G.F.A Monteiro / Revista de A
xamination. Equally important, for any of the five forces, the
auses of competitive intensity are multidimensional, i.e., it goes
eyond the price.
The multidimensional nature of rivalry among firms is impor-
ant in order to understand the link between competition and
roductivity. According to Porter (2001), some forms of rivalry
ave a greater impact on productivity, being more valuable to
ociety. For example, if cost/price margins are used as a metric
f social benefit, then the strategy of imitation and price dis-
ounting seems ideal from the traditional antitrust point of view;
owever, from the viewpoint of productivity growth, this type of
ompetition could lead to a less intense dynamic improvement
f the economy. By contrast, competition based on differentia-
ion can generate a larger set of choices for consumers as well
s more intense innovation in products and processes. In other
ords, when considering productivity growth as a standard for
ntitrust, one should be aware of the kind of competition that is
ursued within a country. This brings us to a second analytical
tep: examining the nature of local competition.
Porter (1990) notes that even in locations where firms com-
ete internationally, the vitality of local competition is crucial
o the increasing of productivity. The local competition has the
ower to create positive externalities for the firm – for example,
hrough the stimulus for market rivalry and innovation, as well
s the increased availability of skilled labor, information and
esources. Accordingly, when the local rivalry is cooled down,
 country suffers two effects: not only firms in the industry have
ess incentive to be productive, but also the entire business envi-
onment becomes less productive. According to Porter (2001),
he appropriate tool to examine local competition is the dia-
ond model (Porter, 1990) in which six factors interact to create
avorable conditions for innovation.7
From an antitrust perspective, both the five forces analysis
nd the diamond model are analytical tools used in order to
nswer a central question: how a merger (if approved) would
ffect productivity growth? Although Porter (2001) recognizes
hat the direct estimation of productivity growth is a difficult task,
he relationship between competition and the long-term increase
n productivity enables the development of an analytical frame-
ork divided into three stages. First, the antitrust analyst should
xamine the significance of the merger (or joint venture), as well
s the basic conditions for productivity growth. This involves
hree steps. (i) Identification of the set of relevant markets and
ubmarkets associated with the merger, and the geographical
rea in which one can find local externalities. (ii) Definition of
 market share threshold above which mergers will be analyzed
ore carefully.8 (iii) Identification of the historical performancef the industry and firms, as well as the characterization of the
obustness of rivalry in the industry.
7 The six factors that encompass the model are: (i) factor conditions (human
esources, physical resources, knowledge resources, capital resources and infra-
tructure), (ii) demand conditions, (iii) related and supporting industries, (iv) firm
trategy, structure and rivalry, (v) government, (vi) chance events (i.e., events
utside the control of a firm).
8 Porter suggests a 50% threshold.
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In the second stage, the analyst must undertake a complete
ompetitive assessment, using five forces analysis and the dia-
ond model. The goal is to predict the effects of the merger on
roductivity growth. Specifically, the five forces analysis is used
o measure the competition in the industry taking into account all
arkets and submarkets identified in the previous stage. Since a
umber of factors affects each force, the analyst must scrutinize
ach particular factor. The starting point is to identify the base
evel of each factor and the direction it is moving before and
fter the merger (increasing, decreasing, or steady).
Finally, in the third stage, if it is found that there are signifi-
ant adverse effects on the competition in the industry or on the
ocal competition, one should examine the direct effect of the
erger on productivity growth. The key questions are: Does the
peration generate significant and verifiable benefits to facilitate
roductivity growth? Are such benefits perpetual or limited to
 specific instant of time? What is the probability that the gains
re actually realized? In answering these questions, the antitrust
nalyst can make a decision on the merger.
Porter (2001) lists the advantages of using the five forces anal-
sis for the examination of mergers and acquisitions. According
o the author, the traditional antitrust analysis is built upon a
hort-term, static look, other considerations being aggregated in
he analysis as “adjustment arguments”. The strategic analysis,
n turn, is based on a multidimensional concept of competi-
ion and is not focused solely on price. Strategic analysis also
akes the precise definition of the boundaries of the relevant
arket dispensable, since it embodies all the major influences on
ompetition.9 Accordingly, the indexes of market concentration
e.g., Herfindahl Hirschman Index – HHI) lose their prominent
osition in the antitrust analysis. This perspective on antitrust
ound a strong supporter in Weller (2001a, 2001b). In advo-
ating the application of the approach in the antitrust analysis,
eller (2001b: 47) notes that:
“The Productivity Paradigm is fundamentally new and dif-
ferent in numerous ways. Productivity replaces efficiency,
and standard of living replaces consumer welfare, as primary
goals; it does not use concentration theory, HHIs, profitabil-
ity, price increases and other tools of current antitrust analysis
to determine the legal issue of whether or not a substantial
lessening of competition is likely; it eliminates the need to
determine the relevant market; it uses new empirical tools that
are measurable, understandable and rigorous like the widely-
used Five Forces analysis, Diamond analysis of the business
environment, and the Market Share Instability Index [.  .  .]”.
riticismWhen called upon to assess Porter’s proposal, Einhorn
2001), Baker and Salop (2001), and Werden (2001) formu-
9 For the delimitation of a relevant market, the traditional antitrust analysis
ssesses the behavior of a hypothetical monopolist, taking account of its capacity
o make a “small but significant no transitory increase in price” (SSNIP test) of
ll products in a certain market. The relevant market is defined as the smallest
rouping where such a price increase can be sustained in a profitable manner.
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two assumptions when developing their strategic approaches
founded on a resource-based view. The assumptions are: (i) firms
within an industry are heterogeneous with respect to the strategic
10 The Structure-Conduct-Performance model was developed in the 1930/40
at Harvard University, becoming one of the initial references of Industrial Orga-
nization. The model is concerned with causal flows that build on the basic
conditions and market structure toward the behavior and performance of firms.
The objective is to describe the conditions for increasing competitiveness of
industries, having served as a major inspiration for antitrust policy in its early
days. See generally Scherer and Ross (1990).
11 Yet, it is remarkable that Porter’s appeal toward a more holistic under-G.F.A Monteiro / Revista de A
ated strong counterarguments to the application of the five
orces analysis and the diamond model in the traditional antitrust
nalysis. According to Einhorn (2001) Porter (2001) does not
onsider the fact that measures of concentration as indicated in
he Horizontal Merger Guidelines represent only a first-round
creening process. It not only allows for the identification of
safe harbors”, but also provides a first approach to the prob-
em, so that larger operations that raise competition concerns
ay be investigated in more detail. Moreover, Baker and Salop
2001) note that modern economic theory does not support the
dea that market concentration is useless as a guide for merger
nalysis.
Einhorn (2001) also argues that, contrary to that suggested
y Porter (2001), price-based competition is generally more
mportant than productivity aspects in a significant number of
ndustries. In addition, although the development of new prod-
cts is an extremely important aspect of economic development,
his is not something that can be easily foreshadowed by the
ourts or by experts without a considerable degree of subjectiv-
ty. Accordingly, it is proposed that Porter (2001) fails to define
he conditions necessary for a comprehensive analysis of pro-
uctivity, with appropriate empirical measures and a theoretical
odel that relates the five forces to identifiable parameters in a
iven merger.
A third object of criticism is the fact that the productivity-
ased approach disqualifies the definition of the relevant
arket as a fundamental aspect of antitrust analysis. Werden
2001: 68) makes the following comment with reference to
eller (2001b):
“Mr. Weller apparently would include [in a relevant mar-
et] distant substitutes, complements to them, products produced
ith similar inputs, inputs into the production of the products
n question, and products produced using the products in ques-
ion as inputs. Casting the net this broadly may be useful in
dentifying all of the factors that may somehow affect prices or
utputs, but it does not identify the locus of likely anticompeti-
ive effects”.
Finally, the authors criticize the suggestion – incorpo-
ated into the second stage of Porter’s analysis – to define
he direction in which each factor that influences the five
orces is moving before and after the merger (increasing,
ecreasing, or steady). Werden (2001: 69), for instance, argues
hat
“[T]here is no mechanism (for example, no use of eco-
nomic models) for determining whether a change in intensity
classification is likely to materially affect price, out-
put, quality, or any other index of industry performance,
nor one for trading off opposing changes in intensity
classifications”.
On a more elementary level, the various commentators con-
ider that Porter’s contribution to the antitrust analysis is per
e limited to the extent that both the antitrust and the five
orces analysis seek inspiration from the same theoretical frame-
ork, namely the Industrial Organization. Porter was successful
n reversing the logic of the structure-conduct-performance
s
b
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aradigm,10 providing tools for managers to understand the
ompetitive landscape of an industry and thereby to develop
trategies in order to lessen the competitive pressures. Under
his view, it is argued that Porter’s contributions to antitrust may
e only marginal (i.e., amendments to the current Guidelines).11
t the end of the day, as already evidenced by Oberholzer-Gee
nd Yao (2010), the Porter’s approach failed to become a ref-
rence in antitrust and therefore the antitrust three-legged stool
as not yet found its missing leg. In what follows, I present some
ew ideas that may clear the way in the search for a contribution
rom strategy for antitrust analysis. As will be seen, the path
aken differs from that originally proposed by Porter (2001).
hinking  ahead:  is  there  a  role  for  strategic  analysis
ithin antitrust?
Although the strategic approaches inspired by Industrial
rganization (notably, the five forces analysis) are widespread
n the corporate world, the strategic scholarship witnessed the
mergence of a new strategic approach in the 1980s, the so-called
esource-based View (RBV) (e.g., Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993;
umelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). According to Foss (2005), it
as only after the advent of the RBV that strategy found its
urrent configuration: the key aspect of strategic management
nvolves creating and sustaining a competitive advantage at the
rm level, where a sustained competitive advantage is inter-
reted in terms of extraordinary rents obtained in equilibrium.
In contrast to the five forces analysis, the RBV casts a more
icroscopic look at the business agents, having as a unit of anal-
sis the firm’s resources. From the perspective of the RBV, firms
ontrol a set of productive resources which vary from company
o company. A resource can be valuable in a particular industry or
 particular moment in time, and may not have the same value in
nother industry or in a different context. More importantly, the
esource heterogeneity among firms explains the achievement of
ompetitive advantage. The concept of heterogeneity is central
ecause it helps explain the existence of differences in economic
erformance between firms that operate within the same indus-
ry. This aspect is largely neglected by strategic analysis inspired
y Industrial Organization.
Accordingly, Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993) take ontanding of the competition – i.e., taking into account extra-price factors – has
een discarded with reckless speed, especially in the corridors of the antitrust
gencies.
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esources they control and (ii) the resources do not have perfect
obility, which contributes to the perpetuation of heterogeneity
or a reasonable period of time. Considering the existence of
mperfect mobility of resources, the creation and sustainability
f economic rents becomes possible. Barney (1991) and Peteraf
1993), however, develop different approaches to the RBV (see
oss, 2005). Barney (1991) is primarily focused on the build-
ng of sustained competitive advantages derived from Ricardian
ents.12 Peteraf (1993), on the other hand, explicitly consid-
rs the building of sustained competitive advantage from both
icardian rents and monopoly rents.13 For the purposes of this
rticle, the approach advanced by Peteraf (1993) is more conve-
ient since the author explicitly considers the possibility of the
rm obtaining monopoly rents, the object of antitrust analysis.
Peteraf (1993) argues that resources controlled by the firm
enerate a sustained competitive advantage when four corner-
tones are present: (i) resources are heterogeneous within the
ndustry, so that the firm can generate superior incomes (Ricar-
ian or monopoly rents); (ii) the existence of ex post limits on
ompetition, so that the rent is not dissipated by competition in
he product market; (iii) resource mobility is imperfect, allow-
ng the preservation of the economic rent within the firm; (iv)
xistence of ex ante limits on competition, indicating that the
arket of productive factors is unable to appropriate all income
enerated by the resources.
In what follows, I discuss how these ideas can be incorporated
nto the antitrust analysis.
oward  a  resource-based  dialog  within  antitrust
The strategic analysis inspired by the resource-based view
an be of particular help in the antitrust analysis of the competi-
ion pattern in an industry. Specifically, the RBV can shed light
n competitive peculiarities that would remain hidden in a more
raditional economic assessment. In order to make my argument
ore precise, I roughly divide the antitrust analysis of mergers
nd acquisitions in four sequential steps:
(i) The analysis begins with the definition of the relevant mar-
ket of the merger.(ii) Based on this definition, the analyst proceeds in the cal-
culation of market shares of the firms before and after the
merger. The goal is to identify whether the firm resulting
12 Ricardian rents arise because of the presence of superior productive factors,
hich are limited in supply.
13 Peteraf (1993: 182) notes that “[i]n monopoly models, heterogeneity may
esult from spatial competition or product differentiation. It may reflect unique-
ess and localized monopoly. It may be due to the presence of intra-industry
obility barriers which differentiate groups of firms from one another (Caves
nd Porter, 1977). It may entail size advantages and irreversible commitments
r other first mover advantages. There are numerous such models. What they all
ave in common is the supposition that firms in favorable positions face down-
ard sloping demand curves. These firms then maximize profits by consciously
estricting their output relative to competitive levels. These are models of mar-
et power. Unlike Ricardian models, many are ‘strategic’ in that firms take into
ccount the behavior and relative position of their rivals”.
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from the merger holds a market share sufficiently high as
to make credible any possible abuse of market power.
iii) Assuming that the firm resulting from the merger presents
a high market share, the analyst is supposed to examine
the pattern of competition in the industry. The goal is to
determine whether the remaining agents in the market are
able to compete effectively with the firm resulting from the
merger.
iv) Based on the hypothesis that the pattern of competition in
the industry is not enough to mitigate the abuse of mar-
ket power, one must examine the efficiencies associated
with the operation. The goal of this step is to compare the
gains arising from the merger with the potential damage to
competition indicated in the previous steps.
In its usual template, the analysis of the pattern of industry
ompetition (step iii) essentially involves four aspects: the role
f imports (are imports an effective remedy against the exercise
f market power?), the conditions of entry of new competitors in
he industry, the way rivalry is expressed in the market, and the
xistence of conditions for the coordination of decisions in the
ndustry. Specifically regarding the analysis of market rivalry, it
s expected that competitors be able to absorb a significant share
f the market in response to the exercise of market power by
he merged firm. The rivalry is considered not effective when
ompetitors operate at full capacity, the expansion of the pro-
uction capacity of the rival firms is not economically feasible in
ess than two years, the expansion of production involves high
osts or, in the case of differentiated products, consumers are
haracterized by high brand loyalty.
This way of understanding market rivalry clearly indicates
he influence of Industrial Organization on the antitrust analy-
is. When addressing a particular case, an antitrust analyst tries
o characterize the rivalry in the relevant market. To this end, he
r she assumes that firms are roughly equivalent (except for the
resence of differentiated products) and examines the industry
s a whole. Recent (or not-so-recent) models of demand sys-
ems with which merger simulation can be performed explicitly
ecognize differences among firms’ products and predict the
ikely conduct following a merger (see, for instance, Carlton
 Keating, 2015; Coate & Ulrick, 2016; Nevo, 2000). This
ype of approach has positive aspects, allowing, for example, the
dentification of the competitive pattern of the market (Bertrand
ompetition, Cournot competition, etc.). Yet, considerations of
ndividual firms and their resources are, in most cases, ignored.
ven when the analyst seeks to incorporate in her analysis more
ubtle aspects of the firms, she finds herself at a loss since she
oes not have suitable analytical tools. As a result, more detailed
nalyses of the firms are at risk of becoming mere anecdotal
eports.
It is exactly at this point that the analysis inspired by the
esource-based view can contribute to antitrust analysis. In order
o better understand the rivalry between firms in a market, the
nalyst may ask herself: Have companies in this industry sus-
ained competitive advantages? Resorting to the logic proposed
y Peteraf (1993), this issue unfolds in four questions.
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oes  the  ﬁrm  have  economic  rent?  What  is  the  nature  of
his rent?
If a firm has a sustained competitive advantage, this means
hat it produces some level of economic rent. As previously
oted, firms may have Ricardian rents or monopoly rents. On
he one hand, the condition of heterogeneity between firms may
e associated with the presence of superior production factors,
hich are limited in supply. These factors of production are the
asis of Ricardian rents: the firms that own the production factors
re able to get higher profits precisely because there is a short-
ge in the supply of underlying valuable resources. On the other
and, the heterogeneity of firms may result from spatial compe-
ition (Hotelling competition), product differentiation, barriers
o mobility within the industry itself, advantages derived from
ize (e.g., economies of scale), etc. These resources are the basis
f monopoly rents because they allow the firm to deliberately
estrict its production without all customers stopping consump-
ion of the good or service.
It is interesting to note that according to the structure-
onduct-performance paradigm, if a firm gains persistently
bove normal profits, it is assumed that some form of market
ower exists in the market. Quite the reverse, the Chicago School
ssumes that in the absence of barriers to trade supported by the
tate, the higher profitability of the firm indicates higher produc-
ion arrangements. The RBV is in the middle ground: although
ot denying the possibility of monopoly profits, the RBV also
onsiders the possibility that above normal returns represent
icardian rents associated with particular resources held by the
rm (Locketta & Thompson, 2001). The antitrust analyst must
herefore understand the origin of the superior performance of
he firm.
oes  the  economic  rent  offset  the  cost  incurred?
Assuming a firm has monopoly profit, a key condition must be
et in order for the firm to sustain this competitive advantage. As
 matter of logic, before any firm establishes a superior position,
here must be limited competition for that position; otherwise
he market competition would erode any differential income. In
ther words, there must be ex  ante  limits  to  competition.
The condition of ex ante limit to competition is analyzed
ithin the RBV as a condition of imperfection in the factor
arket in such a way that competition between economic agents
oes not generate an excessive rise of the cost (price) of strategic
esources. Given the existence of market imperfections, a firm
s able to acquire a resource at a lower price than the present
alue of the income stream associated with the resource itself.
his condition ensures that the firm will be able to effectively
enerate a positive flow of income. In contrast, in the absence
f market imperfections, firms could obtain only normal profits.
s the  economic  rent  challenged?
The mere fact that a company earns an economic rent (i.e.,
chieves a competitive advantage) does not indicate that the firm
s successful in sustaining this rent. The sustainability of the
ompetitive advantage requires that the condition of resource
eterogeneity be preserved. If heterogeneity is a phenomenon
f short duration, the income is short-lived and the firm enjoys
c
a
e
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emporary competitive advantage. Thus, subsequent to the firm
stablishing a superior position – and thereby earning rents
 there must be forces that limit competition for those rents
Peteraf, 1993). In other words, the rent is only sustained when
here are ex  post  limits  to  competition. The concept of an ex post
imit to competition is not restricted to the idea of barriers to
ntry. As noted by Locketta and Thompson (2001: 746): “firms
hat have superior resources and/or are better at deploying those
esources than others will be able to earn above average returns.
owever, in the presence of changes in demand and innovation,
ustained above average returns do not necessarily indicate the
resence of barriers to entry”.
According to Peteraf (1993), the RBV emphasizes two criti-
al factors that determine the sustainability of income, namely:
mperfect substitutability and imperfect imitability. In general,
he presence of substitutes reduces the income of a firm by mak-
ng the demand curve of a monopolist or oligopolist more elastic.
n the other hand, firms can take advantage of isolating mech-
nisms in order to gain protection against imitation and thereby
reserve their income. According to Rumelt (1984), isolating
echanisms include property rights to scarce resources, infor-
ation asymmetry, switching costs and buyer’s search costs,
eputation, and economies of scale associated with specialized
ssets.
Barney (1997) argues that the cost disadvantage of a spe-
ific competitor to imitate a resource may be derived from three
ources, beyond the legal protection provided by patents. First,
he acquisition or development of a resource can be based on
pecific historical conditions. In this case, the firm that owns
he resource is characterized by first mover advantage or path
ependence. Secondly, the imitation of a resource can be costly
ue to the presence of causal ambiguity between the resource
nd the competitive advantage – that is, managers may not fully
nderstand the relationship between resource and economic
rofit. This type of situation occurs generally when the resources
hat generate competitive advantage are part of the daily expe-
ience of a company and therefore are not noticed. Examples
re the organizational culture of the firm and the good relation-
hip with its suppliers. In the third and last place, the imitation
f a resource held by the firm can be costly when the resource
epresents a socially complex phenomenon. In this case, even
hough one may specify the way in which resources generate
ompetitive advantage (absence of causal ambiguity), the effec-
ive imitation of the resource may be too costly. As an example,
ven assuming that we can clearly identify the organizational
ulture as a source of competitive advantage in a particular firm,
his does not imply that a rival is able to mimic such a culture.
Taken together, the elements listed by Barney (1997) bring an
mplicit criticism to the theory of contestable markets (Baumol,
anzar, & Willig, 1982). According to this antitrust theory, a
onopolist would be unable to charge monopoly prices under
he assumption that entrants can quickly and inexpensively start
perations in the market. That is, entrants would incur zero sunk
osts, suggesting some sort of symmetry between incumbents
nd potential entrants. The RBV, in contrast, emphasizes the het-
rogeneity of firms arising from their particular experience. In a
orld of path dependent heterogeneity, the sunk cost incurred by
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ntrants tends to be ubiquitous (Locketta & Thompson, 2001).
lthough this argument does not completely challenge the the-
ry of contestable markets, it suggests that the antitrust analysis
ust be implemented with care, taking into account the role
layed by the heterogeneity of the resources held by the firms.
s the  economic  rent  appropriated  by  the  ﬁrm?
A higher income not being challenged does not mean that it
s automatically appropriated by the firm. Economic profit will
nly be sustained if the resources are characterized by imperfect
obility which ensures that income is tied to the firm.
From the strategic point of view, resource immobility ensures
hat resource holders are unable to appropriate all of the rents
enerated within the firm. If resources were mobile, rival firms
ould be able to get control of the sources of competitive
dvantage. At the margin, the competition between firms would
ause the resource holder to capture the full economic profit.
eteraf (1993) argues that resources are imperfectly mobile
hen they are somewhat specialized to the specific needs of
he firm (Williamson, 1975) or when they are co-specialized
Teece, 1986). Other resources can be imperfectly mobile sim-
ly because the transaction costs associated with its transfer are
oo high.
From the antitrust perspective, the important point to note is
hat imperfectly mobile resources remain linked to the firm and
herefore available for use in the long term. Returning to the
iscussion on the theory of contestable markets: if the dominant
osition of a firm in the industry stems from a resource developed
ver time (path dependence) and, moreover, such a resource
annot be easily removed from the firm (resource immobility),
he barriers to entry in the industry are much higher than the
raditional antitrust examination may suggest.
In general terms, the RBV teaches us that sustained com-
etitive advantage requires the heterogeneity of the firm, the ex
nte and ex post limit to competition, and imperfect mobility of
esources. As soon as these conditions are met, the economic
rofit will be sustained. In antitrust terms, the implications are
lear: if a firm is able to generate monopoly profits and simulta-
eously is able to sustain this profit, then antitrust intervention
ecomes necessary. A much more subtle issue emerges when one
akes into account that not all firms wishing to obtain monopoly
rofit will be successful. The RBV tells us that monopoly profit
s sustained only when the conditions listed above are met. In
hese terms, it is possible to say that (see also Fig. 1):
 If the cost incurred to establish a competitive advantage is
higher than the income earned, economic rationality implies
that the firm does not pursue the strategy and thus there is no
antitrust concern. The same goes for the case where income
is challenged by ex post competition and, simultaneously, the
firm finds it difficult to appropriate the income generated.
 When the firm is able to appropriate the income (imperfect
mobility of resources), but the income is challenged by ex post
competition, the competitive advantage is temporary and may
be understood as an inherent part of capitalist dynamics.
 Finally, when resources are mobile and income is not chal-
lenged by ex post competition, two situations can happen: (i)
o
(
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the firm may not have the incentive to continue the strategy,
since it fails to appropriate the income; (ii) the firm may be in
a stable equilibrium so that there is a continuous transfer of
income to resource holders. In this case, antitrust intervention
is justified, but must be selective – it may be not enough to
intervene just in the product market.
llustration
I present in this section some empirical evidence. The discus-
ion outlined here should be seen as an illustration and not as a
eliberate test of the application of the RBV logic to antitrust.
pecifically, I reassess a case analyzed in 2008 by the Office of
air Trade (OFT), the British antitrust authority. It refers to the
cquisition of the online DVD rental business of Amazon (UK)
y the company Lovefilm.
As expected, the OFT tried to define the relevant market of
he operation in its initial review of the case. To this end, the
ntitrust authority conducted a critical loss analysis (Harris and
imons, 1991; Katz & Shapiro, 2003), finding evidence that the
elevant market is broader than just the service of online DVD
entals. The OFT, however, faced difficulties in accurately defin-
ng a boundary for the market. On the one hand, consumers
an access video content in various alternative ways. On the
ther hand, the OFT failed to unambiguously identify a sec-
nd best option for content delivery channels for consumers
o replace online DVD rental. The OFT chose, then, to ana-
yze the competitive closeness between Lovefilm and Amazon,
nd between the merged companies and alternative delivery
hannels.
The OFT drew heavily on field research to measure the diver-
ion ratio of consumers (i.e., the cross-elasticity between goods),
nd on internal documents of the parties to describe their busi-
ess practices. The quantitative analysis based on the field study
dentified the hypothesis that the merger could cause a substan-
ial reduction of competition, giving space for the potential abuse
f dominant position by the merged companies. By analyzing
he documents submitted by the parties, however, the OFT even-
ually refuted the hypothesis of negative effects of the merger,
nce it became clear that the parties consistently monitor and
espond to movements of other competitors, including compa-
ies that do not operate directly in the market of online DVD
entals.
Of particular interest is the fact that the OFT was unable to
learly identify a boundary for the relevant market. The OFT
rgued that there is a large number of channels through which
onsumers can access video content, making it impossible to
raw a clear boundary between them. My basic argument is that
 resource-based assessment of the case can bring new insights
o this analysis. I start from the OFT own description of the
hannels by which consumers can access film and TV video
ontent. The main characteristics of these alternative channels
re presented in Table 1.In order to assess the case, I resort to a representation
f the competition space as proposed by Peteraf and Bergen
2003) – see Fig. 2. Peteraf and Bergen (2003) introduce
wo constructs – market  needs  correspondence  and capability
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Table 1
Channels by which consumers can access film and TV video content.
Channel OFT assessmenta Consumption characteristics Companies’ resource
differentials
Online DVD rental
(ODR)
Subscription services whereby customers pay a fixed
monthly fee which entitles them to receive through the
post DVDs which they have selected online in advance
from a wide range of titles. Once the customer has
watched a DVD, he/she posts the DVD back to the ODR
supplier in a prepaid envelope whereupon the ODR
supplier sends the next available DVD on the customer’s
list. Customers have no time limits imposed within
which they must return the DVD and, accordingly, no
late fees are incurred.
Home consumption
Home delivery of the movie
Absence of time limit to
return the DVD
Flexibility to watch the movie
according to consumer’s own
availability
Movies back catalog
Logistic capabilities
Technology capabilities
(online user interface)
Competence on customer
acquisition and retention
(brand)
Brick and mortar
rental (traditional
DVD rental
channel)
Customers pay a set fee per disk to rent a DVD for a
night and/or a slightly higher fee for renting for a longer
period. Individual brick and mortar stores traditionally
do not offer a back catalog (i.e., DVDs that are not
recent releases) on the scale of ODR providers.
Home consumption
Flexibility to watch the movie
according to consumer’s own
availability
Shop location
Competence on customer
acquisition and retention
(brand)
DVD retail Consumers can purchase DVDs from a number of
alternative retail channels. Despite recent price
reductions in DVD retail, permanent purchases are still
substantially more expensive on a per-unit basis than
ODR and other rentals but have the benefit of permanent
access to the content.
Home consumption
Home delivery of the movie
(online purchase)
No return and full use
flexibility
Movie back catalog
Logistic and technology
capabilities (online
purchase)
Pay per view (PPV) Dedicated television channels show films at scheduled
intervals that consumers can pay for in addition to the
television subscription packages of which PPV channels
are a part. With PPV the film is shown at the same time
to everyone ordering it. Traditionally the number of
films available at any given time is small compared to
ODR, and access is on a one-off basis but has the
advantage of convenience inasmuch as consumers do
not need actively to search and select titles in the way
required by ODR or brick and mortar rental.
Home consumption
Home delivery of the movie
Reduction in searching and
selecting costs
Technology capabilities
(online user interface)
Distribution cost is
minimal (using an
existing channel).
Specialist film
channels
Consumers can subscribe to basic and premium channel
packages from cable operators, satellite providers, and
telephone companies using cable or IPTV, and other
multi-channel distributors through monthly subscription
packages. Choice is relatively limited and titles are
usually available to consumers later than they are
available to buy or rent but, like PPV, specialist film
channels have convenience advantages.
Home consumption
Home delivery of the movie
Reduction in searching and
selecting costs
Distribution cost is
minimal (using an
existing channel).
Video on demand
(VOD)
VOD operates through a computer server and enables
viewers to access content at any time from a
pre-determined list of films and TV programs. Unlike
PPV, VOD allows consumers to watch a film/TV
program at an individual time of their choosing. Choice
of back catalog with VOD may be significantly
restricted by comparison to ODR but titles can be
purchased on a one-off basis rather than by subscription
only.
Home consumption
Flexibility to watch the movie
according to consumer’s own
availability
Technology capabilities
(online user interface)
Free to air TV Given free to air TV does not require subscription or
incremental payment above the cost of the Freeview
box, there is no incremental cost for viewing the content
but choice is relatively limited and titles are usually
available to consumers later than they are available to
buy or rent.
Home consumption
Low cost
Distribution cost is
minimal (using an
existing channel).
Internet download Consumers can gain access to films on their computers
via the internet. Once rented, customers typically have
24 h to view the programs/films.
Home consumption
Home delivery of the movie
Use flexibility
Technology capabilities
(online user interface)
a OFT assessment as presented on ‘Anticipated acquisition of the online DVD rental subscription business of Amazon Inc. by Lovefilm International Limited’,
ME/3534/08, at pages 2–5.
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Does the economic 
rent offset the cost 
incurred?  
(Ex-ante limit to 
competition?) 
Is the economic 
rent challenged?  
(Ex-post limit to 
competition ?) 
Is the economic rent 
appropriated by the 
firm? 
(Imperfect mobility?) 
Antitrust implication 
No - - Rent is not sustainable. Lack of antitrust 
concern. Yes No  Yes 
Yes Temporary rent. Lack of antitrust concern. Yes  Yes 
Yes No  No 
Firm has no incentive to continue the 
strategy. 
If the firm is in a stable equilibrium, there 
is continuous transfer of income to 
resource holders. Antitrust intervention is 
justified, but must be selective. 
Yes Yes  No Sustainable rent. Antitrust intervention is 
needed. 
Fig. 1. RBV analysis in the presence of market power.
Need for movies for home
consumption
Other movie consumption
needs
Specialist film
channels
PPV Free to air TV
Brick and
mortar rental
Online DVD rental
Internet download
VOD
DVD retail
(online)
II
IV III
I
Film studios
Big retailers
(including digital)Non-competitors
Weak StrongCapabilities in offering flexibilty
to consumers; content delivery
capabilities; movie back catalogue
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quivalence  – whose basic function is to allow the assessment
f commonalities between companies. Market needs correspon-
ence is a dichotomous indicator that seeks to capture whether a
articular company or channel serves or not the same consumer
eeds as the focal company/channel. Capability equivalence
efers to the extent to which a particular company has resource
nd capability bundles comparable to the resource and capabil-
ty bundle of the focal company/channel in terms of its ability to
eet similar consumer needs. The emphasis is on the role played
y resources, which may be dissimilar in kind but similar in use
r functionality.
The connection of the two concepts occurs through a graphi-
al representation (see Fig. 2). The Y-axis represents the market
eeds correspondence (measured as yes or no), and the X-axis
epresents the capability equivalence (measured as high or low).
ompanies in quadrant I are those that meet the consumer need
t comparable levels of satisfaction. According to Peteraf and
v
p
ctition – online DVD rental.
d on Peteraf & Bergen (2003).
ergen (2003), the closest direct competitors of the focal com-
any/channel are included in this set, as well as rival companies
ffering substitute commodities. Companies located in Quadrant
I are those that meet the same basic consumer needs compared to
he focal company/channel, but use resources that are not equally
ell suited for the task. Peteraf and Bergen (2003) indicate that
hese companies are essentially those which provide vertically
ifferentiated products (i.e., with a different quality level in rela-
ion to the focal company). Companies located in Quadrant III
re potential competitors of the focal company/channel. These
ompanies, though not meeting a consumer need equivalent to
he focal company/channel, have a set of resources and capabili-
ies that allow it to serve the same market with little incremental
nvestment. Lastly, companies in quadrant IV represent, in the
iew of Peteraf and Bergen (2003), those who are less likely to
resent competitive threats to the focal company/channel. These
ompanies do not meet a consumer need that matches the focal
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potential directions for future research.
A first direction comes from the emergence of business
ecosystems as a new organizational form. A business ecosystem
14 Peteraf and Barney (2003: 316) note that “[w]hile factors, in general, may
range from pedestrian and poor quality factors, to those that are rare and special
[. . .] we focus on those factors that have a significant positive effect onG.F.A Monteiro / Revista de A
ompany market, nor have the resources and capabilities that
llow them to do so at this point.
Based on Table 1, I define that online DVD rental caters to the
onsumer need of home movies. More specifically, the online
VD rental enables consumers to watch movies without the need
o leave home in order to get the content and offers the flexi-
ility of watching according to their personal availability, over
n undetermined period of time. Aiming to offer services that
an satisfy this consumer need, companies must possess strong
esources and capabilities on film catalog, logistical capabilities
to send movies via mail, control DVD returns and ship new
VDs), technology capabilities (especially regarding the online
nterface with the consumer) and must also possess a strong
rand that encourages retention of consumers.
It is worth noting that the requirements listed above do not
epresent a set of resources that must necessarily be retained
o that a company can compete with the online DVD rental
ervice. In the case of downloading movies via the Internet,
or example, it is plausible to assume that this type of channel
epresents a significant rival of online DVD rental, even if it does
ot make sense for the company to have a strong competence
n logistics. In this particular case, the company must have the
echnological expertise to enable it to deliver content (i.e., the
lm) to the consumer as soon as a purchase is made. For the
urposes of I analysis therefore, it may be appropriate to consider
hat companies must possess strong delivery capability, given the
usiness model selected.
One factor that distinguishes channels is consumer flexibil-
ty in watching the movie according to their own availability.
he flexibility comes from the business model of each type of
hannel, and is directly associated with the resources that sup-
ort each business model. As stated, in the online DVD rental
odel, the consumer can keep the DVD for an undefined period
f time (see Table 1). The brick and mortar store, on the other
and, cannot allow the consumer to keep the DVD for an indef-
nite period. If it does so, consumers would be unable to find
he DVD they wanted in the store, and this would erode the
ttractiveness of the store to consumers. Alternatively, the store
ould hold a large stock of copies of each video, but that would
ncur higher stock costs in each store. As another example, it is
easonable to assume that there are technical and commercial
spects justifying the practice of pay per view channels show-
ng a movie on a fixed schedule, leaving the consumer to plan to
atch the movie at the specified time. The same reasoning above
pplies in the case of the delivery convenience (greater when the
onsumer receives the movie/content at home) and in the case
f available movie options (movie back catalog). Once again,
oth the delivery model and the menu of available movies are
ssociated with the resources that support each business model.
Fig. 2 attempts to illustrate these characteristics. One point
o bear in mind is the fact that the resources and capabilities
nalyzed in the horizontal axis do not represent an exhaustive
isting. In fact, there would be little gain in doing so. For theanager/strategist as well as for the antitrust analyst, the point
f greatest relevance here is to emphasize the resources that
istinguish companies of quadrant I from companies located inistração 52 (2017) 317–329 327
uadrant II.14 An antitrust analyst could allocate in quadrant I,
esides the online DVD rental, the downloading of content via
nternet, VOD and DVD retail (assuming purchases were made
nline and delivered by mail or courier). This set of business
odels offers the consumer a greater choice set (movie back
atalog), besides greater flexibility and convenience compared
o brick and mortar retail, PPV, broadcast TV and specialized
ovie channels (quadrant II). Quadrant III presents business
odels that, despite not meeting the need for domestic con-
umption of movies, gather resources that make it possible to do
o.
The OFT reports that there is sufficient evidence suggesting
hat the company Lovefilm considers all types of video content
elivery channels as its competitors. In line with the discussion
n the preceding section (see Fig. 1), it means that other forms
f content delivery may be able to impose ex-post competitive
ressure on the merged companies, thus challenging its eco-
omic rent. It is interesting to note that from a resource-based
erspective (Fig. 2), one may identify three implicit assump-
ions underlying the OFT conclusion. First, the OFT conclusion
s based on the idea that the download via the internet, the DVD
etail and the VOD impose fierce competition on online DVD
ental. They can do so because they have similar resources that
nable them to fulfill the same consumer need. Second, because
ompanies in quadrant II have weak capabilities in offering
exibility to consumers, the OFT conclusion depends on the
ssumption of high cross elasticity of demand between the prod-
cts and services offered by companies located in quadrant I
nd those located in quadrant II. Finally, the OFT conclusion is
ounded on the assumption of low entry barriers so that compa-
ies located in quadrant III can impose competitive pressure on
he companies located in quadrant I.
Largely, the goal here is not to determine whether the analysis
ndertaken by the OFT was appropriate or not. The objective is
o show how the analysis of companies’ resources can generate
nsights on antitrust analysis which cannot be generated from
eceived approaches.
hat  comes  next?
Although I have illustrated the application of the RBV logic
o antitrust, much of the previous discussion is based on a static
dea of manufacturing industries. While this fact is a clear lim-
tation of my paper, it also invites us to push the boundaries of
he discussion in new directions. In what follows, I outline twoeither the economic costs or perceived benefits associated with an enter-
prise’s products (Peteraf, 2001). Wernerfelt (1989) refers to these resources
as critical resources, a term which includes both resources and capabilities”.
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s a network of organizations, which make possible the pro-
ision of a given product or service through both competition
nd cooperation. According to Moore (1998, p. 168), a business
cosystem is an “extended system of mutually supportive orga-
izations; communities of customers, suppliers, lead producers,
nd other stakeholders, financing, trade associations, standard
odies, labor unions, governmental and quasigovernmental
nstitutions, and other interested parties. These communities
ome together in a partially intentional, highly self-organizing,
nd even somewhat accidental manner”.
The key aspect is that the “traditional economic theory does
ot focus on business ecosystems as a distinct form of organi-
ation and does not provide conceptual templates that can be
sed to detect, inspect, and assess business ecosystem” (Moore,
006, p. 35). However, in its heart, business ecosystems are
ased on core resources and capabilities, which are exploited
ith the purpose of producing a core product or service (Moore,
996). It means that the RBV may bring important contributions
o the discussion, focusing on organizational and technological
rade-offs. Kappor and Lee (2013), for instance, show how orga-
izational forms shape new technology investments in business
cosystems. Adner and Kaapor (2010) examine how the struc-
ure of technological interdependence affects firm performance
n business ecosystems.
A second direction in the application of the RBV logic to
ntitrust is the analysis of the relationship between competi-
ion and innovation (e.g., Shapiro, 2012). Productivity growth
ostered by innovation is but one example of this, and market
tructures should be assessed by their ability to both deliver con-
umer surplus and long-run incentives to innovate. The notion
f static efficiency that underlies much of my discussion could
enefit from the more dynamic analysis of antitrust and strategy
s developed by Teece and coauthors (e.g., Jorde & Teece, 1990;
idak & Teece, 2009).
Another related area of investigation is the competition pat-
ern associated to multi-sided platforms (e.g., Evans, 2003)
ainly in the internet (e.g., Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne,
006; Varian, 1999). Although recent studies have discussed
he contractual nature of platforms (e.g., Monteiro, Farina &
unes, 2014), it is still necessary to deepen the investigation of
he underlying resources that support this specific organizational
orm. Potential relevant antitrust insights may derive from such
nvestigation.
onclusion
The present article is divided into two parts. Initially, I under-
ake a review of the current debate between antitrust and strategy.
t is specifically noted that much of the contemporary discussion
n the subject is focused on the productivity-based approach pro-
osed by Porter (2001). This approach, while shedding light on
mportant antitrust issues, is to some degree not fully innovative,
ince both Porter and the traditional economic antitrust analysis
eek inspiration in the same source (Industrial Organization). In
he second part of the paper, I propose a new approach to antitrust
ased on the resource-based view of strategy. This approach is
articularly useful in examining the conditions of market rivalry,
Histração 52 (2017) 317–329
eing a complement – not necessarily a substitute – to the tradi-
ional antitrust economic analysis. The application of the RBV
o antitrust is appealing because it encourages a more micro-
nalytical view of the phenomenon of competition, favoring a
ore detailed study of the idiosyncrasies of firms.
As a research agenda, future studies should seek new areas
ithin antitrust in which the RBV can contribute. Researchers
hould pay particular attention to RBV potential contributions
or the antitrust assessment of business ecosystems, the dynamic
onditions of competition, and multi-sided platforms. Similarly,
t is expected that antitrust agencies be opened for these new
pproaches. It is increasingly imperative that those responsible
or the enforcement of the antitrust laws be more connected with
hose who are affected by their decisions, i.e., entrepreneurs and
anagers. The antitrust approach inspired by the resource-based
iew of strategy is well suited to accomplish this task.
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